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Abstract1 . We examine the concept of security as a
dimension of Quality of Service in distributed systems.
Implicit to the concept of Quality of Service is the notion
of choice or variation. Security services also offer a
range of choice both from the user perspective and
among the underlying resources. We provide a discus-
sion and examples of user-specified security variables
and show how the range of service levels associated with
these variables can support the provision of Quality of
Security Service, whereby security is a constructive net-
work management tool rather than a performance
obstacle. We also discuss various design implications
regarding security ranges provided in a QoS-aware dis-
tributed system.
Keywords.  Quality of Service, Quality of Security
Service, variant security, security range.
1  Introduction
Quality of Service (QoS) mechanisms benefit both the user
and the overall distributed system. QoS users benefit by
having reliable access to services; and the distributed
systems whose resources are QoS managed benefit by
having more predictable resource utilization and more
efficient resource allocation (that is, in systems where
allocation efficiency is supported). The motivation for the
work described here has been to help determine if this
reliability, predictability and efficiency can be enhanced
by including security as a real part of QoS, transforming
security from a constant performance obstacle into a
constructive network management tool. We have termed
the effects of this inclusion, “Quality of Security Service”
(QoSS).
Inherently, QoS involves user requests for (levels of)
services which are related to performance-sensitive
variables in an underlying distributed system. For security
to be a real part of QoS, then, security choices must be
presented to users, and the QoS mechanism must be able to
modulate related variables to provide predictable security
service levels to those users.   This raises the question of
1. This work was supported under the MSHN Project of the
DARPA/ITO Quorum Program.
whether it makes sense within the context of coherent
system security paradigms to provide such security choices
to users. It is also of interest to understand how the limits
on these choices are defined, and how those limits relate to
existing resource security policies
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview,
rationale and motivation for understanding QoSS and
variant security, and how these concepts may benefit
future application and system designs. The remainder of
this document is structured as follows: Section 2 provides
background on Quality of Service concepts related to
security services; Section 3 describes the concept of
Quality of Security Service, and provides a discussion of
the general “assurability” of application-centric security
enforcement mechanisms; Section 4 provides a description
and rationale for various forms of user and application
security “ranges;”  Section 5 describes some design
considerations regarding variant security in distributed
multi-tiered systems; and Section 6 is a summary
discussion.
1.1  Related Work
The OSI Basic Reference Model Security Architecture
document[1] provides information and analysis about
network communications security services and
mechanisms, including a mapping of security services to
mechanisms and OSI layers, and describes the behavior of
lower layers in responding to security service requests.
This analysis provides a good summary of network
security services from the perspective of protection of
communications. Our approach is intended to include
security services other than those specific to
communications protection, and our service model is more
oriented to the n-tier architectural framework rather than
the OSI protocol stack. The OSI work does not address the
constructive management of security variability.
A Quality of Protection parameter is provided in the GSS-
API specification [16]. This parameter is intended to
manage the level of protection provided to a message
communication stream by an underlying security
mechanism (or service), “allowing callers to trade off
security processing overhead dynamically against the
protection requirements for particular messages.” Another
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early reference to a variable security service is that of
Schneck, and Schwan [19], which discusses variable
packet authentication rates with respect to the management
of system performance. Our work is intended to extend
these efforts into a more general framework which is
applicable to a wide range of policy, processing and
networking contexts, as well as diverse security services.
References to security in the QoS literature can be found in
[7], [3], and [23], although little is mentioned there of
security variability or use of security as a functional QoS
dimension. QoS itself has been extensively discussed in
the literature, and we refer the reader to [3] for a thorough
review of QoS definitions and architectures.
A trust management system [4][5] provides a language and
mechanism for specifying security policies and credentials,
and may include a policy server or compliance checker to
resolve questions about access control. The trust
management system is not concerned with the nature of the
specific policies (e.g., those involving variant security)
which it stores and resolves. Nor is the trust management
system expressly concerned with QoS issues. However, a
QoSS system could be built to utilize a trust management
system to store and resolve security range relationships.
2  QoS and Resource Usage Control
The resource usage load on traditional (e.g., not inter-
networked) multi-user systems could be understood,
simplistically, to be a linear function of the number of
users. Similarly, user load could be seen as a function of
the number of user terminals configured for the system.
Thus, a system administrator could govern the system
resource usage load, to a degree, by controlling the number
and type of user input terminals (e.g., interactive terminals,
modems and card readers). In a distributed and inter-
networked environment, system administrators are often
without recourse to such straightforward and simplistic
resource-usage control approaches, since the number and
type of user “terminals” and associated tasks may not be
bounded by local (e.g., campus or enterprise) topographies.
In some cases, users of system resources may extend
across the Internet. The Quality of Service paradigm is
designed to help address this problem by providing to
users and administrators certain tools for managing
resource usage and service levels.
Quality of Service refers to the ability of a distributed
system to provide network and computation services such
that each user’s expectations for timeliness and
performance quality are met. There are several dimensions
of Quality of Service described in the literature [7][22],
including, accuracy, precision and performance. For a
Quality of Service dimension to be supported means that
users can request or specify a level of service for one or
more attributes of these dimensions, and the underlying
QoS control mechanism (QoSM) is capable of entering
into an agreement to deliver those services at the requested
levels. Therefore, the control mechanism must be able to
modulate the level of the service to individual subscribers
(e.g., users). For example, a network-based multimedia
application might be expected to deliver video frames so
that the display is jitter-free to some requested level
[22],[7].
In addition to meeting individual user requirements, a
QoSM makes choices that permit it to maximize overall
benefit in accordance with its QoS policy. For example,
one QoS policy might require that benefit be equally
shared among all tasks. This would mean that if network
resources were over subscribed all tasks would have a
reduction in service. Another policy might state that no
service is better than poor service, so that if resources were
sufficiently oversubscribed, some tasks would be
postponed or terminated. This policy could be extended so
that certain tasks would be given priority for guaranteed
service during times of resource congestion.
Users present their expectations to the QoS mechanism by
way of service level requests. These requests can take the
form of both hard and soft requirements [21]. In essence,
the system enters into a contract with the user to meet the
hard and soft requirements. Hard requirements mandate
fixed service levels that the QoSM must deliver if it is to
accept the user’s task; whereas, a soft requirement can be
considered to define a range of acceptable service, for
example, in terms of bandwidth, response time, or image
fidelity. Each soft requirement represents a variable which
the QoSM can manipulate in balancing the needs of
multiple users. Given latitude in the user’s soft
requirements, the more variables that the control
mechanism has to manipulate, the easier will be the job of
satisfying the set of current users. Conversely, the QoSM
can offer choices to the user (in response to which the user
may enter hard or soft requests) only for aspects of the
system over which it controls, and is willing to provide, a
range of service. For aspects in which there is no such
control, only a fixed or “best effort” type of service can be
delivered, so QoS concepts (e.g., regarding service level
requests) do not apply.
3  Security
The purpose of this section is to provide an analysis of the
role of security in a system designed to provide QoS.
Security has long been a gleam in the eye of the QoS
community: many QoS RFPs and QoS system-design
presentation slides have included a place-holder for
security, without defining security as a true QoS dimension
(as above). Some of these presentations have provided
access control mechanisms within the QoS framework
[17][15], but they have only touched on security as a QoS
dimension.
3.1  Quality of Security Service
We believe that QoS mechanisms can be more effective if,
like response time and image fidelity, variable levels of
security services and requirements can be presented to
users or network tasks, providing security choices within
acceptable ranges, where “level of service” can indicate
degrees of security with respect to assurance, mechanistic
strength, administrative diligence, etc. As described above,
these ranges result in additional tools (i.e., parameters)
with which the QoSM can successfully meet overall user
and system demands, in balancing costs and projected
benefits to specific users/clients (see discussion of QoSS
specification and cost framework in[10]). Furthermore, if
user security service requests are defined as ranges, then
the underlying system can adapt more gracefully to
changes in resource availability during the execution of a
task, and thereby do a better job at maintaining requested
or required levels of service in all of its dimensions.   We
use the term Quality of Security Service to refer to the use
of security as a quality of service dimension.
To recap, the enabling technology for both QoSS and a
security-adaptable infrastructure is variant security, or the
ability of security mechanisms and services to allow the
amount, kind or degree of security to vary, within
predefined ranges. This notion of network Quality of
Security Service has the potential to provide administrators
and users with more flexibility and potentially better
service, without compromise of network and system
security policies.
3.2  Application-Centric Security
The traditional view of access control was OS-centric. The
operating system enforced a policy, to the best of its
ability, and ideally, objects never left the control domain of
the OS. Policies that were enforced globally and
persistently within this domain were considered to be
“mandatory,” and all others were considered to be
“discretionary” [6]. With the advent of distributed/
heterogeneous applications, data storage objects, operating
systems, and resources, and a plethora of middleware
mechanisms for managing those distributed entities,
application-centric access control has now become
common, if not the norm [4]. In this Brave New World, the
application itself (perhaps in concert with some
middleware mechanisms) enforces access control on its
objects, rather than depending for this function on an
underlying (e.g., OS and hardware) control mechanism.
Thus, network applications have assumed some functions
of the traditional OS. If the applications’s objects are
completely encapsulated, such that the object never leaves
the control domain of the application2, then a global and
persistent policy could be said to be enforced, assuming
persistence on the part of the application. However, this is
a necessary, but not sufficient condition for effective
policy enforcement.
Another traditional aspect of policy enforcement was the
notion that, to be considered highly effective, access
control should be performed at the lowest level(s),
including hardware, of a strictly layered system. The
reason for allocating access control functions to the lower
levels is that it is more feasible, then, to ensure that the
mechanisms are non-bypassable, persistently enforced, and
small enough to allow thorough analysis (e.g., see [2]).
Thus, regardless of how well formed or misused was an
application, if the enforcement layers were well formed,
the policy enforcement could be ensured. Modern
distributed applications do not necessarily have these two
properties (dependency layering, and access control
implemented at the lowest levels). A network application
typically depends on an untrusted operating system for
access to resources, and we suggest that no application
under these conditions can be considered to enforce a
security policy with high effectivity (assurance). Neither is
dependency layering a fundamental design consideration
in many modern distributed or object-oriented applications
and systems. As a result, the distributed application needs
to be analyzed very carefully to understand whether or not
it has the capability, by virtue of its design, to enforce a
policy; for without understanding the dependency layering,
it will not be clear on which other modules the application
depends, nor will it be clear if there are fatal (e.g.,
circularly dependent) or semantically undefined execution
sequences. Therefore, under the conditions described here,
much more design analysis may be involved in
understanding the degree to which a distributed system is
capable of enforcing a security policy, than was required to
analyze a traditional layered system.
We present in the following pages some thoughts about
how QoSS can be understood and managed. The QoSS
approach may be applicable in certain distributed systems
which utilize application-centric access control concepts.
This is not to say that this approach ameliorates the design
analysis problems of application-centric access control. On
the contrary, we would reiterate that each such system
needs careful design review to understand the effectiveness
of its security mechanisms. Hopefully, the security
abstractions presented here will aid in such analyses.
4  Security Ranges
The notion of security ranges may, at first, seem strange or
even an oxymoron. For many, security is thought to be
binary: either you have it or you don’t. On a gross scale,
this is true. Without some minimum level of security, a
2. Note that if the object is allowed to leave the applica-
tion’s domain, then it is more difficult to argue that a glo-
bal policy is enforced; a component of one such
argument for a distributed application is that objects in
transit are protected, perhaps by cryptographic mecha-
nisms, to the extent that the object remains, logically, in
the control domain of the application.
system will be considered inadequate for user
requirements. Yet if a user’s minimum requirements are
met, can there not be some choice with respect to what is
adequate? Our answer is “yes.” As an initial example,
suppose that a user requires medium assurance at end
systems where a distributed task will be executed. If
potential target platforms range between medium and high
assurance, there is a choice. In fact, if the medium
assurance system is over-subscribed while the high
assurance system is idle, the user may realize better overall
service by electing to execute the task on the high
assurance processor.
Consider the security administrator's or the user's
motivation in agreeing to or specifying a range of security.
As with multimedia image resolution, users will generally
desire the greatest amount of security (or image fidelity)
available, but this desire is generally tempered by cost. The
cost may take the form of monetary charges (unlimited
bandwidth but at a high cost per byte) or performance
degradation (for high resolution, processing and download
times will be long), for example. When the cost is very
high (e.g., slow response time), users may be willing to
accept security (or imagery) that is less than their ideal
level of service. Thus, the user/administrator’s acceptable
security would range from a minimum to an ideal. A
system that is sufficiently flexible may be able to impose
performance degradations on others when an application
that is willing to pay enough or has the highest priority is
introduced. By indicating a range within which they are
willing to operate, the poorer or lower priority tasks will
still be able to run rather than being terminated or rejected.
Yet, once a user (or security officer) decides on the
minimum level of security required for a given application
or scenario, why would they ever agree to more security, if
it increases their cost? In general, the increase in cost will
be acceptable to the user only if it is accompanied by a
commensurate increase in some other associated level of
service, such as:
• likelihood of task completion
• performance factors, such as latency and throughput
• storage/output device features such as supported
media, or format
• data features such as color, accuracy and precision
In other words, more security and higher costs will be
acceptable if it results in an increase or stasis in the overall
satisfaction with the task invocation (see discussion of
“benefit functions” in [12][11][14]); thus, users could be
motivated to consider security ranges above their
established minimums. For example, an application may
have variable data formats which have correspondingly
variable security requirements, as shown in Table 1. Here,
the degraded image requires less security, and conversely,
the enhanced image requires more security. So a user
might allow/welcome heightened security if it is
accompanied by greater image fidelity.
An example taken from a popular military novel will help
to illustrate our point. Suppose that high, medium and low
resolution images of enemy troop movements are
available. Here we will assume that resolution and fidelity
are equivalent. To protect the technology used to obtain
the images, they are classified at high, medium and low
sensitivity levels, respectively. As part of the conflict in
question, the vehicles broadcasting the images are under
threat, such that their availability is dynamic. For enemy
troop analysis in tactical planning, any resolution image
will suffice, however, the low resolution images are from
old, slow equipment, and the high resolution image
channel is restricted to emergency use (here, part of the
cost of using the high-resolution channel is the need to
justify its usage at a later date). Therefore, the tactical
commander issues a request for troop movement images
with fidelity in the range of low to high, in the following
priority order: medium, low, high (such that high would be
used only when no other channel is available). Thus, we
have a situation in which the user would prefer medium
security but will also accept low or high security images,
depending on what is available.
An integrity example may also be useful. Suppose that a
surgeon is performing a delicate brain operation remotely.
To ensure that only the precise brain locations are affected,
high fidelity is required. Additionally, there is a
requirement for high integrity to ensure that the video
stream is not tampered with by malicious entities who
might wish harm the patient. Secrecy is not a requirement,
yet if the only secure communication channel available
provides both a high level of secrecy and integrity the
operation is provided high secrecy as a bonus resulting
from fidelity and integrity requirements.
The following are some more examples of the use of real
and hypothetical security ranges.
• Collaborative applications, such as video
teleconferencing with shared electronic white boards,
and application suites, may present communication
security choices to participants. For example, if a
group member is participating in the collaboration
from a hotel room in a foreign country known for
government support of corporate espionage, his
security requirements and choices will be quite
different than if he were in “friendly” territory.   These





Table 1: Security Choice Related to Fidelity Choice
user or application can select, and can include
different levels of authentication, confidentiality, and
integrity.
• Destination subnets could be classified by risk factor
with respect to routing through, execution on, or
logging on to nodes in those subnets[1]. Users,
applications or enterprise-wide mechanisms could
request of middleware control mechanisms that
communications or tasks executed on the user’s behalf
utilize a specific risk range of subnets (e.g., the user’s
QoSS specification might include the request to use
any “high to very high” security subnets for this
invocation).
• Some environments may offer the user choices of log-
on authentication technology. For example, a user
may log on with a password, a one-time password
(crypto challenge-response), a public-key smart card,
a biometric, or some combination of these.   In these
environments, the user could be granted greater access
to resources (e.g., a higher classification of data) if he
uses higher-assurance authentication [13].
• Another example is that the underlying system
supports different situational modes. For some modes
(e.g., normal, impacted, emergency), the user or
administrator may be willing to accept more (or less)
security for a given application. A commander under
attack at a foreign embassy might require the highest
communication security; whereas a commander under
attack on the battlefield might declare, “damn the
security, full speed ahead!” The MSHN resource
management system is an example of a system in
which the management of mode vs. security
requirements is designed to be handled automatically
[8][9].
• The security policy for a hypothetical commercial sub-
network requires outgoing IP packet encryption. In
this environment, a multimedia application exports
digital images (e.g., high resolution fine art images).
However, recognizing that the stake-holders in this
specific environment can tolerate a media stream
which is partially or periodically encrypted (viz, one
yielding a suitably obscured image, which would
render a stolen image unusable by the vast majority of
its target market), the policy may only require that a
range of from 80% to 100% of the packets should be
encrypted. (Note that in some risk models, such a
periodic encryption method might require fortified
protection against cryptanalysis. In addition, care must
be taken to ensure that the entire unencrypted image is
not revealed in repeated transmissions.)
• Variable packet authentication [19] is a corollary to
the preceding confidentiality scenario. In this case, the
sender or recipient might be satisfied if (only) a
certain percentage of the packets in an image stream
were authenticated (e.g., 80% to 100%). Depending
on the threat model and the packet-checking
algorithm, to detect attacks attention may need to be
paid to the ratio of good to bad packets: if all of the
packets were bogus, and only 80% were checked (and
consequently dropped), it might be possible for the
display program to show a completely bogus image,
utilizing the remaining 20%.
• The number of “rounds” performed in a cryptographic
transformation algorithm, such as the Advanced
Encryption Standard, could be used as a Quality of
Security Service variable, to the extent that more
rounds consume more resources and provide more
security.
• An administrator may choose to run an intrusion
detection system within an effectivity range rather
than at a fixed level. There would be a minimal level
of IDS processing below which the system would not
be permitted to fall, but the IDS would be balanced
against performance requirements of the
organization’s tasks. Thus the IDS might perform
more thoroughly (with deeper histories) when the
system is lightly loaded than during peak hours. The
administrator might also choose to set an upper limit
to IDS performance.
• Another variable packet authentication scheme [24],
would be to authenticate only a certain percentage of
each packet. The higher percentage of authentication
could be used, for example, to protect against
steganographic exfiltration of sensitive data.
The following are some example security variables, with
characterizations of how they could be specified or
measured:
• Strength of cryptographic algorithm, e.g., RSA, DES
measured in terms of the work factor associated
with a brute force attack
• Length of cryptographic key
characterized by bit-length
• Security functions present in destination job-execution
environment
characterized by operating system or boundary
control security policy enforcement mechanisms
• Confidence of policy-enforcement in remote login
environment
characterized by third-party evaluation
• Robustness of authentication mechanism
here the range might span weak password, strong
password, biometric, and smart cards with on-
board display and input interfaces
From these examples, it is apparent that the notion of
security ranges is useful and, in some cases, already
evident in existing systems. Thus, we can conclude that it
is reasonable to consider such ranges within the context of
a QoS manager.
5  System Considerations
This section presents some observations about how variant
security can be viewed in a distributed system which
provides QoS support.
5.1  Security Resources, Services and Require-
ments
A network system is defined as the totality of network-
accessible resources. A security service is a high-level
abstract resource providing security functionality such as:
authentication, auditing, privacy, integrity, intrusion
detection, non-repudiation, and traffic flow confidentiality
[10]. A security service typically consumes other low-level
system resources such CPU, memory, disk, and network
bandwidth. For example, the Common Data Security
Architecture (CDSA) [18] describes modules, each of
which contain specific security mechanisms to provide
some of these services.
Each resource (including security services) may embody
security requirements regarding its use. A requirement
may restrict the availability of a resource to an external
entity. Some restrictions might be the typical MAC and
DAC requirements, or other security constraints, e.g.:
encryption available 9 P.M. to 5 A.M., range of available
encryption algorithms, and range of required key lengths.
To be general, we state that all security requirements
define a range of permissible behavior. That is, a range
may be unitary, or degenerate, in which case it represents
no choice. Where a range represents a choice, the
requirement is called security variant.
5.2  Task Sequences
Quality of service can be provided at several levels within
the overall system. The notion of translucence, by which
components can adapt to changing conditions at one or
more other system or network layers, results in a problem
that is both horizontal, viz. distributed across the network;
and vertical, viz. distributed within the stack.    In the
following discussion, the management of QoSS can be
seen to have both horizontal and vertical interactions,
depending on the implementation of the various
components.
A task is an application invoked by a user. The task
utilizes various network system services and other
resources. This utilization may be intermediated by
different QoS middleware mechanisms, such as: QoS-
aware object request brokers and application servers,
distributed resource management systems, and various
network traffic managers. In these multiple-tiered
environments, a task is invoked in a task invocation
sequence:
• the user activates the application through some
interface with an application manager (OS, browser,
etc.);
• the application is intermediated by the QoSM; and
• the QoSM submits the application to the system3.
Security requirements may be established or refined by
any or all of: the user, the application, the QoSM, and the
system; we call these entities security requirement
providers.
As an example of how a requirement can be refined within
the task invocation sequence, consider how a typical
application offers the user a choice for some service. If the
user does not indicate a choice, the application may use a
default value. If the user chooses a range, the application
may invoke itself with a particular value within that range.
Similarly, the QoSM may refine the application's choice,
for example, to optimize the overall system (user
population) performance, perform load balancing, etc.
5.3  Security Limits and Choices
In a task invocation sequence, the request is passed from a
previous requirement provider to the next provider. A
security choice for each variant security requirement is
logically included with each request step. The choice may
be implicit or explicit. For example, if no explicit choice is
made, then it may be implicit that the choice is to not limit
or modify the security options proffered at that step. As
with requirements, all security choices define a choice
range, which may be unitary. Thus, each requirement
provider specifies a choice range for each variant
requirement in a given task invocation. For example, the
user selects a range of 50 - 80% for packet authentication
rate. This choice is passed to the next provider (viz., the
application) in the sequence.
For each variant security requirement, each requirement
provider may also have an explicit requirement limit range
(again, unitary or variant) outside of which it will not
accept a request. The limit applies to the request choice
from the previous provider, e.g., a given application will
not accept a range wider than 60 - 100% from the user.
3. It is an implementation detail whether the QoSM returns
advisory parameters to the application and the applica-
tion invokes the system, or the QoSM submits the appli-
cation with those parameters directly to the system. For
simplicity, we assume, here, that the QoSM submits the
application to the system.
5.4  Security Range Relationships
Table 2 shows the various limits and choices we have
identified for security requirement providers in a task
invocation sequence.
Notice that the user does not have an effective limit range,
as he has no previous provider upon whom to enforce such
a range. Also, the system choice range is the level of
service ultimately provided by the system in response to
the request. This is a unitary range, since there is no next
provider to whom a choice might be given.
With so many requirement ranges at different points in the
sequence, how do these ranges relate to each other? The
following relationships appear to be inherent in a task
invocation sequence:
1. The maximum of each limit and choice range
dominates4 the minimum of that range.
2. Each provider's choice range must be within its own
limit range. This restriction reflects the natural
protocol to respect one's own limits.
3. Each choice range must be within the previous
choice range in the sequence. This reflects a natural
protocol to respect the choice of the previous
requirement provider: a requirement provider will try
to fulfill the request of a previous provider. For
example in a quality of service context, a service
provider may accept a request if it can be realized, but
it will not proceed with parameters which are
divergent from (outside) the user’s request.
4. Each choice range must be within the next limit
range in the sequence. This restriction means that
4. For each variant security requirement there is a set of
elements which are partially ordered by a “security”
relation (dominates), and each range is a sub-lattice of
that set such that the maximum of the range is more
secure than the minimum. One range is contained
“within” a second range, if and only if the max of the
first dominates the max of the second, and the min of the
second dominates the min of the first. For two ranges to
intersect means that the maximum of each dominates the
minimum of the other.
requests which are out of bounds will be rejected.
5. The limit ranges of each provider in a task sequence
must all intersect. This is a consequence of the need
for a choice to be within the provider’s own limit, and
within the next limit, as well as within the previous
choice. Obviously, if two ranges in a task invocation
sequence don’t intersect, there does not exist a value
which could satisfy both ranges; this would disallow a
task from execution.
These relationships are illustrated in Figure 1.
Because the choices and limits are partially ordered and
consequently comparable, it is possible for a security
service selection algorithm to be encoded. A QoSM would
maintain databases of static and dynamic resource
characteristics. In the static database, limits might be
recorded while the dynamic database could record current
network conditions and choices. Thus when a new job
enters the system, the QoSM can compute its execution
strategy. We note that this is an NP-complete problem and
extensive work exists on heuristic scheduling techniques,
e.g. [20].
6  Summary
Our goal has been to provide an understanding of QoSS
and variant security, and to determine whether these
concepts can be useful in improving security service and
system performance in QoS-aware distributed systems.
We described the general requirements for system
attributes to participate in the provision of Quality of
Service, and described how certain security attributes
might meet these requirements. We then described various
forms of user and application security “ranges” and
showed how these ranges can make sense in relation to
existing security policies, when those ranges are presented
as user choices. Finally we described security ranges as
forming a coherent system of relationships in a distributed
multi-tiered system.
Our conclusion is that it may be possible for security to be
a semantically meaningful dimension of Quality of Service
without compromising existing security policies. Further
study is needed to understand the effectiveness of QoSS in
improving system performance in QoS-aware systems.
User Application Middleware System
Choice Range provided Yes Yes Yes Service Level
Limit Range enforced No Yes Yes Yes
Table 2: Security Limits and Choices
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